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TITLE TO SOIL UNDER PUBLIC WATERS

TITLE TO THE SOIL UNDER PUBLIC WATERS*-THE
TRUST THEORY
THE history of land titles in America precludes any presumption of ownership of the beds of public waters by the riparian
proprietors, and raises a presumption in favor of the state. The
ownership of all lands in the American colonies was originally in
the crown, and the ungranted lands passed to its sovereign successors. Grants were made by the sovereign to subject or citizen
from time to time, but these grants do not appear to have expressly
included the beds of public waters as a general practice. By the
English common law these beds would not pass by implication in
sovereign grants. There is no authority to show that the subaqueous soil of England ever passed in this manner, and there is
much authority that such an implication should not be made
against the crown. This rule against implication on a crown
grant is as old as the presumption of the riparians' ownership of
the soils of public fresh waters.' The co-existence of the two
helps to explain the origin and meaning of the latter. It is a
presumption of ownership arising from the general, exclusive
enjoyment of the public fresh water beds by the riparians, and this
enjoyment must have originated in some way other than by implication in crown grants, as by possession from time immemorial or
by express crown grant. But as riparians in America have not,
as a general rule, such grants, possession, or enjoyment, there
should be no presumption of ownership by them. Moreover, as
their original grants may generally be shown, there is no need for
such a presumption. Conversely, as the sovereign has seldom
expressly alienated the submerged lands, and as they are rarely
in the exclusive possession or enjoyment of citizens, the presumption as to all the lands under public waters in America ought to
be that of the English common law2 as to lands under tidal waters,
that they remain in the sovereign.
Assuming that title in these lands should be presumed to be
in the state, it is not an unqualified ownership. The public as
from 2 MINNEsoTA LAW REviEw 313.
1The Royal Fishery of the Banne, (1610) Davies Rep. 149.
22 MINNEsoTA LAw REviEw 313.
* Continued
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individuals have certain special rights, quasi-easements and quasiprofits, which are paramount. These include navigation and
perhaps fishing and others. They constitute the jus publicum.
There may be also certain special rights in the riparians, such as
the right of access to the navigable waters. 3 What are public
and riparian rights will, be considered hereafter;, for the present
it will be assumed that such exist and that the ownership of the
state is subject to them. But these rights are not exhaustive of
possible uses of the soil, and the state's ownership, qualified in
extent of use as it may be, extends to all the rights not included in
these special rights. These residuary rights make up the jus
privatum in the land which is presumed to belong to the state.
The next problem is what may the state do with the jus privatum in the subaqueous lands to which it is presumed to have
title? May it grant the jus privatum to its citizens? May the
state or its grantees make any use of the lands which does not
interfere with the jus publicum or with the riparian rights?
May the state, for example, mine the minerals in the lands? It
is not within the scope of the present article to consider the
power of the state to impair or to destroy either the jus publicum
or any special riparian rights that may exist. It will be assumed
that these are preserved.
The problem is fairly presented in State v. Korrer.4 The
state sought to restrain the riparian proprietor from mining iron
ore from the bed of a navigable lake, from destroying the waters
of the lake, and asked an accounting for any ore unlawfully
removed. After commencement of the action a stipulation was
made which recited that from a certain area of the lake the waters
had already been forced back by the defendants, and that a body
of ore had been stripped and prepared for mining, and it was
agreed that the defendant might remove the ore so stripped, and
that the state should be paid for ore removed which it should
finally be adjudged did not belong to the fee owners of the shore
land. This stipulation was confirmed by order of -court. The
defendant had judgment in the lower court, but on appeal it was
declared that the state was entitled to an injunction restraining
the defendant from taking ore below low water mark, and the
cause was remanded.
3 Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., (1876) L. R. 1 A. C. 662, 45 L: J.Ch. 68,
35 L. T. 569; Brisbine v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., (1876) 23 Minn. 114.
4 (1914) 127 Minn. 60 (78), 148 N. W. 617.

TITLE TO SOIL UNDER PUBLIC WATERS

On petition that further directions be given the trial court as
to the stipulation, the Supreme Court said:
"A, majority of the court construe this stipulation as giving
the state the right to an accounting only in the event that the state
is found to be the owner in a proprietary capacity of the mineral
underlying Longyear Lake. The decision of this court explicitly
holds that the state owns the bed of this lake below low water
mark, 'not, however, in the sense of ordinary absolute proprietorship with the right of alienation, but in its sovereign governmental
capacity, for common public use, and in trust for the people of the
state for the public purposes for which they are adapted.' - P rom
this it necessarily follows that the state has no right to recover
the value of the ore, and no right to an accounting under the
stipulation."

Words of similar import occur in many cases in several jurisdictions.5 They express the trust theory of state ownership.
The passage quoted is susceptible of various meanings. It
may mean that the state has only a special right in the soil,
measured by the jus publicum of which it is the conservator.
That interpretation has already been considered and the conclusion
reached that the state has presumptively the jus privatum as well.
Again, it may mean that although the state has title, it must not
use its title to the impairment or destruction of the public right.
That is doubtless intended, and will be discussed hereafter, but
is it the whole meaning? It is true that in State v. Korrer the
waters had been thrown back to get at the ore, but that had been
done before the stipulation for payment of the value of the ore to
the state had been entered into, and it is difficult to see how the
mining of the ore could further infringe the .public right and
why the state should not recover for the taking of its property
although the taking involved a prior invasion of the public right
to which the state was not a party. If the state should not recover
for ore so taken, it would appear at least doubtful whether it has
the right itself to extract the ore even in a manner nowise interfering with the public right.6
5McLennan v. Prentice, (1893)

85 Wis. 427 (444), 55 N.W. 764;

Flisrand v. Madson, (1915) 35 S.D. 457 (470), 152 N. W. 796. Compare
People v. Kirk, (1896) 162 Ill. 138, 45 N. E. 830, 53 Am. St. Rep. 277;
Florida v. Black River Phosphate Co., (1893) 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640, 21

L,R. A. 189.
0 "The governor, attorney general and state auditor are hereby empowered to enter into contracts . . . for the mining and disposing of the
iron ore situate under any waters of any public lake or river in the state
of Minnesota." Minn. Laws 1917 Chap. 110.
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The phrase "sovereign governmental capacity" is equivocal.
The state owns all its public lands in this manner, yet it may
alienate them. "For common public use" is inapplicable to the
minerals in the land, for the use of them is not part of the common
public right and could not be from its very nature. Nor is the
phrase "in trust for the people of the state for the public purposes
for which they are adapted" any more enlightening, for the
taking of minerals is not such a purpose.
Few legal phrases are more loosely used than "in trust." In
the typical trust A has the legal title to property in which B has
the whole beneficial interest. But it is used to describe other
situations. A's land is charged with a payment of money to B.
He is said thereafter to hold it in trust for B. 7 The capital stock
of a corporation is said to be a trust fund for the benefit of its
creditors. In the first example A has no beneficial interest and
cannot rightfully use or alien the trust property for his own
benefit. But in the other examples -A and the corporation have
beneficial interests and may use 'the' property in any way not
inconsistent with the beneficial interests in B or in the creditors.
That the state holds the subaqueous lands in trust with respect
to the jus publicum is, for the present, assumed. That it holds
them in trust with respect to the just privatum is impossible,
unless there may be an inalienable trust without a cestui que
trust in esse or in posse. An owner of land subject to an easement
may make any use of the land which does not disturb the enjoyment of the 'easement. 8 'The owner' of land dedicated for a
public highway may take the grass, trees, or minerals from the
land, or make other uses thereof, provided he does not hinder the
use of the land for highway purposes. 9 These owners hold their
lands subject' to these special uses. They may be said to hold
them in trust for these uses as truly as the corporate state holds
the soil of public waters in trust for public purposes. It is
submitted that the corporate state has both legal and beneficial
interest in the jus privatum, with power to use or alien it for any
enjoyment not inconsistent with the public or riparian rights,
that the trust theory only requires at the most that these special
rights be -preserved, and that its extension to include the jus
privatum is unsound.
7 Woodward v. Walling, (1871) 31 Ia. 533.
s Atkins v. Boardman, (1840) 2 Met. (Mass.) 457.
9 Makepeace v. Worden, (1816) 1' N. H. 16. '
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The origin to which the trust theory is referred confirms this
view. It is frequently said that it was the theoty upon which the
crown's title to the tidal lands in England was based. In Union
Depot Company v. Brunswick,1 0 the court by Justice Mitchell
said that:
"At common law the king as representative of the nation held
in trust for them all navigable waters and the title to the soil
under them. This W'as a sovereign or prerogative and not a
proprietary right. At the revolution the people of each state
became sovereign, and in that capacity hold all these ,waters and
the title to the soil under them for their common use, subject
only to the rights since surrendered to the general government."
The statement that the title of the crown to the subaqueous
lands was not a proprietary right, if that means without any right
of enjoyment or power of alienation, is incorrect. It has no
support in, the English common law and the authority to the
contrary is conclusive. It is true that the ownership of the king
was in his sovereign or prerogative right. He was presumed to
own the tidal lands as part of the ungranted lands of the kingdom,
that being the state of the greater part of them. They were part
of the jura regalia of the crown. By the same right he owned
the bona vacantia in the kingdom, and the crown estates which
went to successors and not to heirs., They were all part of the
regalia of the crown, interests attached to ihe corporate office. of
the sovereign. The king owned them in right of the crown, and
such as remained at his death went by the same right to his
successor."1 But the right in which they were held did not
narrowly limit the modes in which they might be enjoyed. The
king had the profits of crown lands for,revenues. 12 He could use
the lands or grant them away. His prima facie title by the prerogative to the tidal lands could be rebutted by proof of a grant
to a subject. Revenue might be had from these waste lands which
still remained in the crown by granting them away. The power
of the king as sovdreign to dispose of them was not different
from the power of an American state to dispose of its public
lands. The corporatft state owns its, public lands by the same
sovereign right, on trust for all the people of the state, and yet
with the power of use and alienation to raise revenue for the
government, and so for the people through it. The revenue of
(1883) 31 Minn. 297 (300), 17 N. W. 626, 47 Am. Rep. 789.
-z Co. Lit. 16a, Butler's Note 4.
12 7 Halsbury's Laws of England 108, 112.
10

434
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the state was the revenue of the king under the English constitution. That by the king's grant or charter a subject might
have the right of property in the arms and creeks of the sea is
13
asserted by Sir Matthew Hale, adding that it is without question.
It has never been denied in the English cases that the crown might
grant the fee in the foreshore or other tidal lands where it did
not already subsist in the hands of a subject."4 On the contrary,
it made grants of these lands down to the reign of Anne, when
the power of the crown to make further grants was modified by
act of parliament. 15 It is clear that the terms "sovereign and
prerogative" and "proprietary" in the common law were not antithetical but consonant and that the king's title was at once sovereign and proprietary.
The crown, however, held these lands subject to the jus
publicum. To say that it held them in trust for the public use is
perhaps proper enough in view of the variable meaning of the
expression "in trust." It might indeed be said to hold the use
privatum in trust as well. But there is a great difference in the
administration of the two trusts. It holds the lands as representative of the people, as the corporate state wouild in America, in
trust as to the jus privatum to raise revenue for the purposes of
government, and as to the jus publicum to permit the people
directly -to enjoy them. The one is an active trust; the other is
a passive trust. The people have the benefit indirectly in the
one case and directly in the other. In the former the people
have no property, but only a beneficial interest as members of
13 De Jure Mars Chap. V (Hargrave's Law Tracts 17).

14 Hall on the Sea-shore, 14 (Moore's Foreshore 672) ; Attorney Ceneral v. Parmeter, (1811) 10 Price 378; Blundell v. Caterall, (1821) 5 B.
& Aid. 268; Attorney General v. Burridge, (1822) 10 Price 350 (371) ;
Duke of Beaufort v. Swansea, (1849) 3 Exch. 413; Corporation v. Ivall,
(1871) L.R. 19 Eq. 558; Brew v. Haren, (1874) 9 I.R.C.L. 29; Wyse v.
Leahy, (1875) 9 I. R. C. L. 384; Attorney General v. Portsmouth, (1877)
25 W. R. 559.
"From the earliest times in England the law has vested the title to,
and. the control over, the navigable waters therein, in the crown and
Parliament. A distinction was taken between the mere ownership of the
soil under water and the control over it for public purposes. The ownership of the oil, analogous to the ownership of dry land, was regarded as
jus privatum, and was vested in the crown. But the right to use and
control both the land and water was deemed a jus publicum, and was
vested in Parliament. The crown could convey the soil under water so
as to give private rights therein, but the dominion and control over the
waters, in the interest of commerce and navigation, for the benefit of all
the subjects of the kingdom, could be exercised only by Parliament."
Per Earl, J., in Langdon v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, (1883)
93 N.Y. 129 (155).
15 1 Anne Chap. 7 Sec. 5; Coulson and Forbes, The Law of Waters.
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the state; in the. latter -they have a direct enjoyment. The
analogy of shareholders' interests in a business corporation is
apt. The shareholders do not own the property of the corporation, although they have an interest in its management. The
corporation by its corporate officers has the control and power of
disposition of the property for the corporate purposes. But when
a dividend has been declared, the shareholders' interests therein
are direct and regarded as antagonistic to the corporation. 16 So
the crown had complete control over the jus privatum in the land
for the purposes of government, while its subjects' interests in the
jus publicum were direct and antagonistic. The limitation on the
crown's power over the jus privatum was the duty to preserve the
jus publicum.
The disputed question in the English cases was not whether
the crown couldgrant the fee in the tidal lands, but what public
uses the lands should be subject to in the hands of the crown's
grantees." That they should be subject to the public right of
navigation was clear.' s They were also subject to the public right
of fishing on grants made after Magna Charta.19 They were free
from any public right of bathing.20 But whatever were the public
rights to be subtracted, the residuary rights, the jus privatum,
remained to be enjoyed by the crown or by its grantees.
An effective cause of the error that the crown's title to the
tidal lands was on an inalienable trust, and also of the trust
theory in America, was that other fundamental error widely
current in the American cases that the reason of the crown's title
to the tidal lands was the navigability of tidal waters and the duty
of the crown to preserve the public right of navigation. 21 To
explain the riparian ownership of fresh water soils, and so to
maintain the reason, it was repeatedly said that only tidal waters
were navigable in England. The same reasoning used to establish
the crown ownership of the tidal lands, in the first instance,
16 Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co., (1875) 42 Conn. 17.
17 Attorney General v. Tomline, (1880) L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 58, 49 L. J. Ch.
377; Weston v. Sampson, (1851) 8 Cush. (Mass.) 347, 54 Am. Dec. 764.
18 Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable, (1865) 11 H. L. C. 191, 20 C. B.
N. S. 1.
'9 Carter v. Murcot, (1768) 4 Burr. 2162; Warren v. Matthews, (1704)
1 Salk. 357; Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell, (1826) 5 B.& C. 875 (884);
Malcomson v. O'Dea, (1863) 10 H. L. C. 593 (618).
20 Blundell v. Caterall, (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 268.
212 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 326; Carson v. Blazer, (1807) 2 Binn.
(Pa.) 475, 4 Am. Dec. 463; The Daniel Ball, (1871) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557
(563), 19 L. Ed. 999; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, (1892) 146 U. S.
387, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 13 S. C. R. 110.
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required its continuance. So it was argued that the crown cannot
alienate the lands. It is curious how this a priori reasoning,
ostensibly based on the English common law, persisted in America
despite the fact, that all the English authority was against it. It
was only sustained by referring to cases where the jus publicum
itself was in issue. Regarding the title t9 the subaqueous soils
as a matter of law, and assigning the duty of conserving the
public right of navigation as the reason of the crown's title to
the tidal lands, have at once led some American courts to say
that the crown held the lands on an inalienable trust and to hold
that the state in America holds the title to the soils under all
navigable waters, and upon a similar trust. It has already been
pointed out that the common law treats title to subaqueous lands
as a question of fact, with a presumption as to tidal land in favor
of the crown, and that this presumption arose not from the
navigability of tidal waters but from the fact that the tidal lands
had not been generally alienated. The true reason is sufficient
cause for presuming title to all subaqueous lands in the state, but
not for holding them to be on an inalienable trust. On the contrary, it admits the alienability of the lands, at least in respect
to the jus privatum.
The American decisions do not support the extension of the
trust theory to the jus privatum, however much their dicta might
justify it. The actual decisions have been on questions of the
public right. In Martin v. Waddell,22 important as a main source
of the trust theory, Waddell brought ejectment in the circuit court
of the United States for a several oyster 'fishery of one hundred
acres of tidal land in a bay of New Jersey against Martin who
also claimed a right of fishery. The plaintiff derived his title by
mesne conveyances from the Duke of York, who had received the
patent of this territory from the English crown. All governmental
power granted by the crown patent to the Duke of York had
been surrendered to the crown by later proprietors before the
grant under which the plaintiff claimed had been made by them.
The plaintiff had verdict and judgment, but the judgment was
reversed in the federal Supreme Court on the ground that the
dominion and property in the navigable waters, and in the soils
under them, passed as a part of the prerogative rights annexed
to the political powers conferred on the Duke, to be held on the
same trust on which they were held by the crown; that they were
22

(f842) 16 Pet. (U. S.) 367, 10 L.Ed. 997.
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returned to the crown by the surrender of the governmental
powers, so that the proprietors could not thereafter grant un
exclusive right of an oyster fishery in the bay. ' The decision is
logical, if planting and growing oysters in a tidal bed is part of
the public right. But the opinion of the court, rendered by Chief
Justice Taney, discusses the problem as if the ownership of the
soil were inseverably connected with the public right and as if the
right were dependent upon the continuance of the ownership in
the governing power. The opinion contains the important dictum
which has been reiterated with variations in the trust theory
cases:
"When the revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them
surfor their own common use, subject only to the rights since
23
rendered by the constitution to the general government."
The opinion ignores the jus privatum and discusses the problem as if the jus publicum were exhaustive of the possible uses
of the land. The defect is clearly pointed out by Justice Thompson, who said in a dissenting opinion:
"That the title to land under a navigable stream of water must
be held subject to certain public rights, cannot be denied. But
the question still remains, what are such public rights? Navigation, passing and repassing, are certainly among these public
rights. And should it be admitted that the right to fish for
floating fish was included in this public right, it would not decide
the present question. The premises in dispute are a mud flat; and
the use to which it has been and is claimed to be applied, is the
growing and planting of oysters. It is the use of the land, and
not of water, that is in question. For the purpose of navigation
the water is considered as a public highway common to all; like
a public highway on land. If land over which a public highway
passes is conveyed, the soil passes subject to that use, and the
purchaser may maintain an action, for injury to the soil, not
connected with the use; and whenever it ceases to be used as a
public highway, the exclusive right of the owner attaches; so
with respect to land under water, the public use for passing and
repassing, and all the purposes for which a public way may be
used, are open to the public; the owner, nevertheless, -retaining
all the rights and benefits of the oil that may not impede or
interfere with the public highway. Should. a coal mine, for
instance, be discovered under such highway, it would belong to
the owner of the soil, and might be used.for his benefit, preserving
unimpaired the public highway. So, with respect to an oyster
23 Ibid. at p. 410.
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bed, which is local and is attached to the soil. It is not the water
that is over the beds that is claimed; that is common, and may
be used by the public; but the use of the soil by the owner which
the use of the water by the public, is reserved
is consistent with
24
to the owner."
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,25 the most important case on the
trust theory, was decided by the federal Supreme Court three
years later. The decision is the culmination of a series of cases
from the state of Alabama which presented the question of the
ownership of the subaqueous lands in states once territories of
the United States. 6 When Alabama was admitted to the Union
in 1819, the. federal government reserved title to the public lands
in the state. -It thereafter attempted to grant to private persons
lands which were covered by the tidal waters of the Bay of Mobile when Alabama became a state. The final decision was that
the federal government no longer owned these subaqueous lands,
but that they belonged to the state. The pertinent history of the
litigation is as follows:
2
- The supreme court of Alabama decided in Hagen v. Campbell
made
channel,
which
was
that a grant of lands extending to the
by congress before the union, was valid. The court said: "The
shore below the common tide belongs to the public, though by
grant it may become the property of the citizen," showing that
no trusteeship in the then sovereign was present to the mind of
the court. As to the federal grants after statehood, several cases
were disposed of by both the Alabama and the federal Supreme
Courts on the construction of the grants, without questioning the
power of the federal government, but in Mayor v. Eslava2s the
Alabama supreme court held that the federal government had no
power to make such grants, for the reasons, inter alia,-,

"By the acts of congress regulating the survey and disposal
of the public lands, the federal government has renounced the
24 Ibid. at p. 421.
25 (1845) 3 How. (U. S.) 212, 11 L. Ed. 565.
26 Hagen v. Campbell, (1838) 8 Port. (Ala.) 9, 33 Am. Dec. 267;
Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, (1839) 9 Port. (Ala.) 712, reversed (1840) 14
Pet. (U. S.) 353, 10 L. Ed. 490; Mayor and Aldermen of the City of
Mobile v. Eslava, (1839) 9 Port. (Ala.) 577, 33 Am. Dec. 325, affirmed
(1842) 16 Pet. (U. S.) 234, 10 L. Ed. 948; Mobile v. Hallett, (1842) 16
Pet. (U. S.) 261, 10 L. Ed. 958; Mobile v. Emanuel, (1843) 1 How. (U. S.)
95, 11 L. Ed. 60; Pollard's Lessees v. Files; (1841) 3 Ala. 47 reversed
(1844) 2 How. (U. S.) 592, 11 L. Ed. 391: Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan et al.,
(1845) 3 How. (U.'S.) 212, 11 L. Ed. 565.
27 (1838) 8 Port. (Ala.) 9, 33 Am. Dec. 267.
28 (1839) 9 Port. (Ala.) 577 (604), 33 Am.Dec. 325.
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..
title to the navigable waters and the soil covered by them .
The original states, in virtue of their royal charters, are entitled to
the right of property in the navigable waters within, their territory,
while the public are only efititled to an easement.

.

.

.

Ala-

bama is admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
'original states' and of consequence is entitled to the right of property in the tide waters within its limits. By the admission of
Alabama into the Union, without a reservation of the right of
property in the navigable waters, the state succeeded to all the
rights of the United States."
The decision was affirmed by the federal Supreme Court on
the construction of the act of congress, without examination in
the opinion of the court of the reasoning of the Alabama court.
But that reasoning was adopted in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
The opinion of the court was
which followed shortly after.
given by Justice McKinley, who said :29
"Taking the legislative acts of the United States, and the states
of Virginia and Georgia, and their deeds of cession to the United
States, and giving to each, separately, and to all jointly, a fair interpretation, we must come to the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties to invest the United States with the eminent
domain of the country ceded, both national and municipal, for
the purposes of temporary government, and to hold it in trust for
the performance of the stipulations and conditions expressed in
the deeds of cession and the legislative acts connected with them.
To a correct understanding of the rights, powers, and duties of the
parties to these contracts, it is necessary to enter into a more
minute examination of the rights of eminent domain, and the
right to the public lands. When the United States accepted the
cession of the territory, they took upon themselves the trust to
hold the municipal eminent domain for the new states, and to invest them with it, to the same extent, in all respects, that it was
held by the states ceding the territories.
"When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal
footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was
diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and
under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes
provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United States, according
to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. And, if an
express stipulation had been inserted in the .agreement, granting
the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the
United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative; because the United States have no constitutional capacity
29

(1845) 3 How. (U. S.) 212 (222), 11 L. Ed. 565.
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to exercise.municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain,
within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in
which it is expressly granted.
"Alabama is, the-efore,. entitled 'to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits, subject to the common law, to the 'same extent that Georgia possessed it before she
ceded it-to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is
to deny"thatAlabama has been admitted into the union on an equal
footing with the original states, the constitution; laws, and compact, to the contrary notwithstanding. But her righs of sovereigny, and jurisdiction are not governed by the common law of
England.as it prevailed in the-colonies before the Revolution, but
as modified by our own institutions., In the case of Martin and
others v. Waddell, 16 Peters, 410, thepresent chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'When the Revolution took
place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and
in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters, and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights'since surrendered by the Constitution.'
Then to' Alabama belong the' navigable waters, and soils under
themin controversy in this ease, 'subject to the rights siirrendered
by the Constitution to the United States; and no comp.ct thiat
might be'made between her and the United States could diminish or enlarge these rights.

.

.

.

"This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils
under the navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs
exclusively to the states within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional power t6
exercise it. To give to the United States the right to, transfer
to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils under, the navigable \vaters, would be placing in their hands a weapon whichmight
be wield~ed gret.ly to the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive
the states of the power to exercise a numerous and ,important
class of police powers. But'in the hands of the states this power
can never be ised so as to affect the exercise 'of anly national
right of eminent domain or jurisdiction with which the United
States have been inveted by the Constitution. For, although'the
territorial limits of Alabama' have 'extended all 'her sovereign
power into the sea, it is there, as on the shore, but municipal
power, subject to the Constitution of the United States, 'and the
laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof.'.
"By the preceding course of reasoning we have arrived at these
general conclusions: First, The shores of, navigable waters, and
the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the
United States, but were reserved to the, states respectively. Secondly,'The new states have the same rights, sovereignty., and juris30 Ibid. at p. 228.
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diction over this subject as the original states. Thirdly, The right
of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and
disposition thereof, conferred no power
31 to grant to the plaintiffs
the land in controversy in this case."
These cases considered together establish:
1. The United States had both sovereign and proprietary interest in the territory out of which Alabama was formed.
2. Such sovereign and proprietary interest included the public waters and the soils under them. •
3. Riparian titles did not include soil under the waters of the
Bay of Mobile, being tidal waters.
4. The federal government could grant the soil under the
Bay to private persons.
5. It reserved title to 'the public lands upon the admission of
Alabama as a state.
6. It ceased to have power to grant the soil under the Bay
upon the admission of Alabama as a state.
Subaqueous lands are thus distinguished from public lands.
The former pass to the state, although the latter are reserved.
Where did the' proprietary right in them go? That the state
would have the powers of sovereignty, including regulation of
navigation and fishing, save in so far as they were granted to the
United States by the federal constitution, is clear. But-did it get
the proprietary right as well? It was not in the riparians. It is
no longer in the United States. The argument of counsel for the
defendant in Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan is illuminating 2
"A right to the shore between high and low water mark is a
sovereign right, not a proprietary one. . . . The right passes
in a peculiar manner; it is held in trust for every individual proprietor in the state or the United States, and requires a trustee of
great'dignity. Rivers must be kept open: they are not land which
may be sold, and the right to them passes with a transfer of sovereignty."
By ignoring the jus privatum and treating the title to the soil
and waters as altogether a trust to be maintained by the sovereign,
it is made to pass to the state.
The doctrine was vigorously opposed by Justice Catron. In
a separate opinion in Mayor v. Eslava, referring to the reasoning
of the supreme court of Alabama, he said :
31 Ibid. at p. 230.
32 Ibid. at p. 215.
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"That the original states acquired by the Revolution the entire
rights of soil, and of sovereignty, is most certain. And if it be
true that Alabama was admitted on an equal footing in regard to
the rights of soil with the original states, she can hold the high
lands equally with the land covered by navigable waters; and so
can nine other states equally hold, to the utter destruction to all
claim to thd lands heretofore indisputably recognized as belonging
to the United States, as being a common fund of the Union.
"The clause inserted into the constitution of Alabama, reserving the rights of property to the United States, as a compact with
them, embraces lands under water as emphatically as those not
covered with water. But if no stipulation saving the interest of
the United States had been made, they would have had just as
much right to their private property as an individual had to his.
They hold, as a corporation, an individual title.
"That such waters are common for the purposes of navigation
and commerce, in the widest sense, is free from doubt; that Alabama has jurisdiction and power over them, the same as the original states have over their navigable waters, is equally clear. Yet
it does not follow that the fee of the shores, banks, and soils unThe United States, as
der water, is in the state of Alabama.
owner, can do no act to obstruct the free public use of the waters,
more than a private owner of the soil under water could obstruct
the navigation. The individual owner in fee of the bottom of a
navigable river, can cultivate and take out the shell fish or the minerals from the bed; nor can it be doubted that the United States
may pursue veins of silver, tin, lead, or copper, under the bottom
of a bay, the river Mississippi, or a great lake; although they
could not impede in any degree their navigation. So may the assignees or lessees of the United States do the same. Nor can it
be otherwise in regard to the occupation of the lands between high
and low water mark."
And in a dissenting opinion in Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan, he
said :"4

"Between 1840 and 1844, a doctrine had sprung up in the
courts of Alabama (previously unheard of in any court of justice
in this country, so far as I know,) assuming that all lands temporarily flowed with tide-water were part of the eminent domain
and a sovereign right in the old states; and that the new ones
when admitted into the union, coming in with equal sovereign
rights, took the lands thus flowed by implication as an incident of
state sovereignty, and thereby defeated the title of the United
States, acquired either by the treaty of 1803, or by the compacts
with Virginia or Georgia. Although the assumption was new in
the courts, it was not entirely so in the political discussions of the
country; there it had been asserted, that the new states coming in,
with equal rights appertaining to the old ones, took the high lands
34
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as well as the low, by the same implication now successfully asserted here in regard to the low lands; and indeed it is difficult to
see where the distinction lies. That the United States acquired
in a 6orporate capacity the right of soil under water, as well as of
the high lands, by .the treaty with P rance, cannot be doubted; nor
that the right of soil was retained and subject to grant up to the
time Alabama was admitted as a state.
"That the lands in contest, and granted by the acts of 1824
and 1836, were of the description of 'waste or unappropriated,'
and subject to the disposition of the United States, when the a ct
of Congress of the 2d of March, 1819, was passed, is not open to
controversy, as already stated; nor has it ever been controverted,
that whilst the territorial government existed, any restrictions to
give private titles were imposed on the federal government; and
this in regard to any lands that could be granted. And I had supposed that this right was clearly reserved by the recited compacts,
as well as on the general principle that the United States did not
part with the right of soil by enabling a state to assume political
jurisdiction. That the disclaimer of Alabama, to all right and
title in the waste lands, or in the unappropriated lands, lying within the state, excludes her from any interest in the soil, is too manifest for debate, aside from all inference founded on general principles. It follows, if the United States cannot grant these lands,
neither can Alabama; and no individual title to them can ever
exist. And to this conclusion, as I understand the reasoning of
the principal opinion, the doctrine of a majority of my brethren
mainly tends. The assumption is, that flowed lands, including
mud-flats, extending to navigable waters, are part of such waters,
and clothed with a sovereign political right in the state; not as
property, but as a sovereign incident to navigation, which belongs
to the political jurisdiction; and being part of state sovereignty,
the United States could not withhold it from Alabama. On this
theory, the grants of the United States are declared void: conceding to the theory all the plenitude it can claim, still Alabama has
only political jurisdiction over the thing; and it must be admitted
that jurisdiction cannot be the subject of private grant. .
"In Pollard's Lessee v. Files, 2 How. 602, the question,
whether Congress had power to grant the land now in controversy,
was treated as settled. As the judgment was exclusively founded
on the act of 1836, (the plaintiff having adduced no other title,)
it was impossible to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Alabama on any other assumption than that the act of Congress conferred a valid title. I delivered that opinion, and it is
due to myself to say, that it was the unanimous judgment of the
members of the court then present.
"I have expressed these views in addition to those formerly
given, because this is deemed the most important controversy ever
brought before this court, either as it respects the amount of
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property involved, or the principles on which the present judgment proceeds-principles, in my judgment, as applicable to the
high lands of the United States as to the low lands and shores."
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan is the iMagna Charta of the lateradmitted states to the soils utder their public waters. Its principles were later extended to navigable non-tidal waters in states
formed out of territories of the United States. "They (Martin
v. Waddell and Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan) enunciate principles
equally applicable to all navigable waters."3
The point decided in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, that the
United States has no proprietary interest in the soil of the public
waters of a state has been steadily adhered to.
The Supreme
Court of the United States has not, on the other hand, insisted on
any particular manner of holding of these soils by the state.
While they were given to the states on the trust theory as a sovereign right, the states are left free to deal with them as they
see fit.
"If they choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights
which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is
not for others to raise objections.
It properly belongs to the
states by their inherent sovereignty, and the United States has
wisely abstained from extending (if it could extend) its survey
and grants beyond the limits of high water. The cases in which
this court has seemed to hold a contrary view depended, as most
cases must depend, on3 6the local laws of the states in which these
grants were situated.1

The state is thus free to adopt whatever rule it pleases with regard to these lands. Assuming for the present that it may not
destroy or impair the public right, yet since that right is not exhaustive of all the beneficial uses of the lands, there is a residuary
interest which may be disposed of. To deny that power is to say
that there are beneficial uses of the lands, harmful to no one, but
incapable of enjoyment by anyone. The doctrine of Pollard's
Lessee-v. Hagan has accomplished its purpose; it has given the
title to the state. But it did so on the assumption that the public use included the whole beneficial enjoyment.
The United
States held these lands subject to the public right; it could grant
the fee in them subject to the same right; the fee might logically
have been held to remain in it by the reservation of the public
3S justice Bradley in Barney v. Keokuk, (1876) 94 U. S. 324 (338),
24 L. Ed. 224. Cases in which the doctrine is stated are collected in Kean
v. Calumet Canal Co., (1902) 190 U.S. 452 (481), 47 L. Ed. 1134, 23
S.C.R. 651.
36 Barney v. Keokuk, (1876) 94 U. S.324, 24 L. Ed. 224.
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lands when the territory became a state; it was, however, held to
have passed to the state; the state holds the fee subject to the
same public right, and with the same power of use and disposition
that the United States had before the admission of the state.
The courts of several states, regarding the way by which the
state's title to the subaqueous lands is derived, use language that
would limit the interest acquired, or the manner in which it may
be enjoyed. They call it a sovereign or prerogative and not a
proprietary right. It is true that the title passes to the state as
an incident of sovereignty. But analysis of the cases from which
the doctrine originated shows that every right in the lands passes
which the United States had before. Cognizance should be taken
of the fact that the United States had a proprietary right and
exercised a power of disposition over these lands during the territorial status, and the interest and power of the state should be
held to be equally extensive. There is no reason for limiting the
power of the state more narrowly than the power of the crown
or of the United States was limited. And we have seen that they
could use or dispose of such interests as could be enjoyed subject to the public right. The sovereign should be able to make
such use of each interest in the lands as may best subserve the
public good directly or indirectly.
That the state should have power to make such disposition of
these lands as will not impair the public right has been. stated by
the federal Supreme Court itself. In Illinois C. R. Co. v. IllinoiS3 7 the Court held void a grant which it construed as giving

control of navigation of Chicago harbor to a railroad company.
In the opinion of Justice Field, colored as it is by the idea of the
inseparableness of government ownership and the public use, it is
said:
"The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can
never be lost, except as to such parcels a are used in promoting
the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining. It is only by observing the distinction between
a grant of such parcels for the improvement of the public interest, or which when occupied do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining, and a grant of the
whole property in which the public is interested, that the language
37 (1892) 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 13 S.C. R. 110.

And see Hobo-

ken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1887) 124 U.S. 656 (688), 31 L. Ed. 543,
8 S.C.R. 643; Shively v. Bowlby, (1893) 152 U.S. 1, 38 L.Ed. 331, 14
S. C. R. 548.
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of the adjudged cases can be reconciled. General language sometimes found in opinions of the courts, expressive of absolute
ownership and control by the State of lands under navigable
waters, irrespective of any trust as to their use and disposition,
must be read and construed with reference to the special facts
of the particular cases. A grant of all the lands under the
navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within
the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would
be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control
of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for
the improvement of the ngvigation and use of the waters, or when
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace."
The reiteration of the dictum that the state's title is not proprietary, and that it is without any power of alienation, has had
peculiar results in Minnesota. The subaqueous lands were in
part obviously useless for direct public purposes. The courts have
consequently been not unwilling to resign the enjoyment of these
lands to riparian proprietors. Riparian rights have grown to an
unusual fruition through the infltience of the doctrine.' s State v.
Korrer, however, seems to deny the riparians' right to minerals
and the state's right as well. The decision is the logical, but absurd result of the doctrine.3 9
EVERETT FRASER.
UNIMVRSITY OF MINNESOTA.
38 Brisbine v. St. Paul R. Co., (1876) 23 Minn. 114; Carli v. Stillwater
Co., (1881) 28 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 205, 41 Am. Rep. 290; Union Depot v.
Brunswick, (1883) 31 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 626, 47 Am. Rep. 789; Lake
Superior Land Co. v. Emerson, (1888) 38 Minn. 406, 38 N. W. 200, 8 Am.
St. Rep. 679; Miller v. Mendenhall, (1890) 43 Minn. 95, 44 N. W. 1141,
8 L. R. A. 89, 19 Am. St. Rep. 219; Hanford v. St. Paul Co., (1890) 43
Minn. 104, 42 N. W. 596, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 L. R. A. 722.
39 On right to minerals in beds of public waters, see article by Justice
Oscar Hallam, 1MINNEsoTA LAw REVIEw 34.

